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ABSTRACT 
This contribution deals with two questions: a) what is blasphemy and 
what is the difference between blasphemy and discrimination?, and 
b) does the state have responsibilities to protect citizens against blas-
phemy? Although it cannot do without fundamental critiques society 
also needs social cohesion. I discuss British and Canadian law in rela-
tion to blasphemy. With reference to the distinction between two as-
pects of human identity - how we are made without our own doing, 
and how we have come into being because of our own values and be-
liefs – I indicate the difference between discrimination and attacks on 
what is holy to a person.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The main question with regard to blasphemy is of course: Can we justify 
the prohibition against blasphemy by the state? To answer this question we 
need to define the two nouns in this sentence – state and blasphemy – and to 
analyse and give arguments for prohibiting blasphemy. Of course, we should 
do that in the present context. The secularisation and pluralisation of West-
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ern culture caused by massive immigration and changes in worldview makes 
it necessary to rethink the existing arrangements in Western states concern-
ing the church-state relationship. The overwhelming Christian majority of 
former times has given way to a much more varied social composition. The 
populations of the urban areas are made up of a wide variety of national and 
cultural backgrounds. The strong and visible presence of Muslims especially 
has changed the public domain considerably. The cartoons of Mohammed 
shocked Muslims all over the world because blasphemy is a very serious of-
fence in Islamic countries. In this era of the ‘resurgence of religion’ and the 
change in the moral and religious balance in the world, the more or less tra-
ditional arrangements concerning secular and religious worldviews have to 
be rethought. Internal affairs today can have serious international conse-
quences. 
The classical definition of blasphemy – offending the gods or God – is a 
matter of debate, as are arrangements like state churches and established 
religions, or the strict privatisation of religion. Even the reference to Western 
universal values could be disputed – and it is surely not convincing for the 
large and poor populations in many parts of the world. Many immigrants 
come from countries in which blasphemy is strictly forbidden. Whatever the 
law states, mocking the Hindu deities in India will cause strong reactions by 
right-wing Hindus. In Islamic countries blaspheming God, the Qur’an, and 
the prophet Mohammed is very dangerous.1 
The two main questions this paper asks are:  
1) What is blasphemy (in the modern context)? 
2) On what grounds should blasphemy be prohibited (and punished)? 
The argument is structured in ten sections as follows:  
 In the first part of this article we will deal briefly with the classical and 
modern background of the prohibition against blasphemy. We will 
discuss new forms of laws on blasphemy, which place the emphasis on 
the insult to one's worldview, as they developed after the separation of 
church and state and the pluralisation of worldviews (sections 1-3). 
                                                 
1 In Islamic countries people do not understand that Western governments do tolerate offences 
against the Prophet. There were severe reactions to the Dutch film Fitna by the nationalist politician 
Geert Wilders (MP) in Islamic countries, and only secret diplomacy prevented an escalation as hap-
pened also in connection with the Danish cartoons. In fact, the Mobile Police Force surrounded the 
two main mosques in the old Islamic part of Cairo in order to keep acts of indignation under control 
(February 17, 2008). 
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 In the second part of the article we will look at laws on blasphemy in 
the United Kingdom and Canada, and see what distinctions the law 
used in the formulation of the prohibition and the reasons given for 
such prohibition (sections 4-6). 
 In the final part we will discuss the need of critique, the nature of 
blasphemy and the question if blasphemy differs from discrimination. 
In the last section we will deal with the question why the state should 
prohibit blasphemy (sections 7-10). 
 
 
2. BACKGROUND 
The background of the European laws against blasphemy lies, of course, 
in the biblical commandment: ‘Do not misuse my name. I am the Lord your 
God, and I will punish anyone who misuses my name.’2 In ancient Israel, 
which in its ideal form would have experienced the closest relation between 
religion and social life conceivable, the citizens were to respect God, both in 
their own interest as well as in the interest of the people as a whole. Those 
who insulted the Name of God were to be stoned.3 One occasion on which 
this law was applied was the death of Jesus around the year 30. Jesus had 
called Himself the Son of God and/or the Messiah, which was considered a 
serious case of blasphemy. The Jewish Council sentenced him to death for 
this offence and convinced the Roman governor to have him executed.4 
This prohibition against blasphemy has functioned in the background of 
the law in ‘Christian’ countries as well because the church wanted to prohibit 
any insult to God. For a long time the Inquisition preserved what was holy to 
the church and ensured that the viruses of unbelief did not spread freely 
among the population.5 In more enlightened times the severe penalties were 
changed into imprisonment or fines. 
                                                 
2 Exodus 20.7, Contemporary English Version, 1999; note by the translators: ‘misuse my name: 
Probably includes breaking promises, telling lies after swearing to tell the truth, using the Lord's name 
as a curse word or a magic formula, and trying to control the Lord by using his name.’ 
3 Leviticus 24.16. 
4 ‘Then the high priest tore his clothing, saying, “He has spoken blasphemy! Why do we need any 
more witnesses? Behold, now you have heard his blasphemy. What do you think?” They answered, “He 
is worthy of death!”’ (Matthew 26.65f.). ‘The Jews answered him, “We have a law, and by our law he 
ought to die, because he made himself the Son of God”’ (John 19.7). 
5 Cf. the Inquisitor Salamances: ‘the heretic is a most infectious animal: therefore he must be 
punished before the virus of impiety breaks out and spreads outside,’ in: Perry Schmidt-Leukel, ‘Ist das 
Christentum notwendig intolerant?’ in: Rainer Forst (ed.), Toleranz: Philosophische Grundlagen und 
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In ancient Greece already Socrates was sentenced to death, also on the 
charge of unbelief or even atheism. The accusation against him is interesting 
indeed: ‘That Socrates is a doer of evil, and corrupter of the youth, and he 
does not believe in the gods of the state, and has other new divinities of his 
own.’6 We see here how the interests of the state – the corruption of its youth 
– are connected to not adhering to the state religion. His remark about the 
authority of the state (and its religion) and obedience to the divine is as well 
known as it is remarkable: ‘Men of Athens, I honour and love you; but I shall 
obey God rather than you.’ He challenged their authority – in Plato’s descrip-
tion – even more by telling them that they needed a person like him who 
taught them a lesson now and again:  
I am that gadfly which God has given the state and all day long and in all places 
am always fastening upon you, arousing and persuading and reproaching you. 
And as you will not easily find another like me, I would advise you to spare me. 
I dare say that you may feel irritated at being suddenly awakened when you are 
caught napping; and you may think that if you were to strike me dead, as Any-
tus advises, which you easily might, then you would sleep on for the remainder 
of your lives, unless God in his care of you gives you another gadfly.7 
One question is, indeed, if a charge of blasphemy is not too easy a de-
fence of intellectual and spiritual laziness and state power.  
In Islamic law as well, insulting God, the Qur’an, or the Prophet is one of 
the most serious offences. Although death by stoning for blaspheming God, 
the Prophet, or the Qur’an has no clear basis in the Qur’an, the death penalty 
is widely considered to be a general Islamic practice. But this view needs 
qualification. The Shari’ah penal codes that have been recently introduced 
into northern Nigerian states do not prescribe the death penalty for blas-
phemy but prohibit public ‘contempt of any religion in such a manner as to 
be likely to lead to a breach of the peace’ and stipulate imprisonment of two 
years maximum or a fine, and the offender ‘shall be liable to caning which 
may extend to thirty lashes.’8 The law also covers contempt of other religions 
                                                                                                                                         
gesellschaftliche Praxis einer umstrittene Tugend (Frankfurt/New York: Campus Verlag 2000), 177-213 
(184): Simancas, De catholicis institutionibus liber (Roma 1575), Tit. II, n.17. 
6 Plato, Apology, 24b; 26c; transl. Benjamin Jowett, Internet Classics Archive. 
7 Plato, Apology, 30 d-e. 
8 See Philip Ostien (ed.), Sharia Implementation in Northern Nigeria 1999-2006: A Sourcebook. 
Vol. V. The Sharia Penal Code and Criminal Procedure Codes (Ibadan: Spectrum Books 2007), p.  133. 
Ostien also gives variations from the main body of the law that are incorporated into the law by some 
northern Nigerian states. The state of Kano added a subsection to the article quoted in which contempt 
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but does not prescribe capital punishment.  Again, we note that the law is 
also intended to preserve the peace in society. The relevant text in the Qur’an 
is as follows: ‘Have you been joking about God, and His signs and His mes-
senger? Make no excuses! … We should pardon one faction of you. We will 
still punish another faction since they have been such criminals.’9 They have 
to change their habits and honour God. 
 
 
3. THE MODERN DILEMMA: CRITIQUE AND SOCIAL COHESION 
What we see in the cases of Socrates and Jesus is a close connection be-
tween the prohibition against blasphemy and the collaboration between state 
and religious authorities to protect what is holy in itself – God and the gods – 
from contempt. In the Torah the wish to preserve Israel as a holy nation fig-
ures in here. The protection of what is holy also played an important role in 
the case against Socrates. National unity has been understood to include or 
even to depend upon a common belief in God (and common values). There is 
a hadith that also remarks that in practical life Muslims follow the religion of 
their leaders.10 Group identity has been and is a strong incentive for limits to 
religious freedom in many places in the world. On the one hand, we see the 
need for criticising the status quo of a society – sometimes (in the eyes of 
many people and often also the leaders perhaps) harsh criticism – and on the 
other the need for social cohesion and solidarity. I think, in relation to blas-
phemy this is the real dilemma of offensive language, and we will see how 
contemporary governments wrestle with this. 
Laws on blasphemy have been criticised in recent times on the basis of 
the separation between state and church and the impossibility of the state to 
judge whether God can be or is offended by sharp criticism or mockery. In-
stead of talking about an offence against God, the state now talks about of-
fensive language toward what people consider to be holy. The typical difficul-
ties facing lawyers and politicians are: deciding if people are justifiably of-
fended or suffer societal harm as a result of the criticism, if the wording of 
the criticism or its form – as ‘joking’ and mockery – is indeed offensive, and 
                                                                                                                                         
or abuse of the Qur’an or any prophet ‘shall on conviction be liable to death.’ The explanation adds that 
blasphemous books, etc. could incite riots. Cf. p. 133, n. 627. 
9 The Qur’an, Sura 9.64-68; the following sentences mention eternal punishment; oral culture 
did not excel in understatement – neither does the New Testament. 
10 ‘An-nāsu alā dīni mulūkihim’ (people follow the religion of their rulers), Ajluni, kashf al-khafa, 
II/311 (thanks to Fatih Okumus). 
80 HENK VROOM 
 
 
how the balance between the right to freedom of speech and the golden rule 
of social cohesion – ‘Don’t do to others what you would not want done to 
yourself’ – can be preserved. Let us see what the lawyers and politicians have 
changed in the United Kingdom with its established church and its stress on 
‘the fabric of society,’ and Canada with its constitutional guarantee of full 
ethnic, cultural, and religious expression and life – which obviously demands 
modesty with respect to criticism. 
 
 
4. UNITED KINGDOM: FROM BLASPHEMY TO HATE CRIME 
In the United Kingdom the new Racial and Religious Hatred Act (2008) 
has replaced the old blasphemy laws. Invited to comment upon the govern-
ment’s proposal to abolish the blasphemy laws, the archbishops of the 
Church of England acknowledged that those laws have long ‘been recognized 
as unsatisfactory and not very workable offences in circumstances in which 
scurrilous attacks on the Christian religion no longer threaten the fabric of 
society.’11 The church approves of the aim of the new law, i.e. ‘the preserva-
tion of society from civil strife, rather than the protection of the Divine or 
any particular religious beliefs’.12 The abolishment of the law on blasphemy is 
not ‘a secularizing move’, nor is it ‘a general license to attack or insult reli-
gious beliefs and believers’. Nevertheless, the archbishops have serious reser-
vations about the abolishment of the law on blasphemy at a time when reli-
gious identity has become such an important issue and about the inclusion of 
religion among ‘quite different matters, themselves of important signifi-
cance.’13 I will return to this question of identity below. 
The criterion for finding people guilty is if it can be shown that people 
clearly intended to spread hatred and induce ‘a reasonable reaction involving 
civil strife, damage to the fabric of society or their equivalent’, as the High 
                                                 
11 Full text of letter sent to Right Honourable Hazel Blears MP, Secretary of State for Communi-
ties and Local Government by Rowan Williams (Archbishop of Canterbury) and John Sentamu 
(Archbishop of York). Cf. http://www.  cofe.anglican.org/news/pr2008.html. 
12 Although the next part of the sentence quoted here refers to Christian beliefs, ‘and in so far as 
achieving that end indirectly protects religious beliefs, they are the beliefs of Christians generally, not 
just those of the Church of England’, I think that the ‘continuing debate about the nature of our society 
and its values’ lies in the background, and therefore the archbishops stress that the abolishment of 
blasphemy laws are not be understood as affecting the position of the Christian religion in society. 
13 For hate crimes, in relation to disability, race, religion or belief, sexual orientation and trans-
gender; cf. Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 and the explanation on the website of the Home Of-
fice,  http://www.  homeoffice.gov.uk/crime-victims/reducing-crime/hate-crime/index.html. 
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Court stressed in relation to the prosecution of those accused of insulting 
religious people.14 Let us now look at the letter of the law:  
A person who uses threatening words or behaviour, or displays any written ma-
terial which is threatening, is guilty of an offence if he intends thereby to stir 
up religious hatred.15 
The key terms are ‘threatening’, ‘intention’, and ‘stirring up religious ha-
tred’. The legal question, of course, concerns the criteria for deciding be-
tween guilt and innocence, and the related philosophical question concerns 
the nature of reasonable and harmful forms of public criticism, and the bal-
ance between social cohesion and criticism of the status quo. The question of 
reasonable criticism leads to questions of truth, both religious truth (in the 
widest sense of the term) and the truth about the common good, which the 
state is obligated to preserve. To learn more from legal distinctions I will re-
fer to one more example of a law against hatred.  
 
 
5. LIVING IN ACCORDANCE WITH MY CUSTOMS - MULTICULTURALISM 
Canadian law grants all inhabitants of Canada as much opportunity as 
possible – and the right – to live in accordance with their ethnic and religious 
ideas and customs, and politicians have, predictably, wrestled to expand 
these constitutional rights in accordance with human rights in general: How 
is the common good to be combined with human rights and the ideas and 
customs of various ethnic and religious minorities? 
In Canadian law blasphemy is viewed as an insult to believers, rather 
than contempt for any transcendent being, as is clear in this short definition: 
‘Blasphemous Libel: The publication of material that would shock and outrage 
the feelings of believing Christians.’16 The Christian background accounts for 
the prohibition. The difficult question facing the law is not if the prohibition 
should be extended to other religious groups but what counts as an offence. 
Canada respects all ethnic, linguistic, and cultural groups and includes relig-
                                                 
14 ‘[T]here must be contemptuous, reviling, scurrilous and/or ludicrous material relating to God, 
Christ, the Bible or formularies of the Church of England. Second, the publication must be such as 
tends to endanger society as a whole, by endangering the peace, depraving public morality, shaking the 
fabric of society or tending to cause civil strife,’ Quoted in the Archbishops’ letter.  
15 Racial and Religious Hatred Act, 2006, ch.I, art. 29b (1). 
16 The on-line dictionary of the Superior Courts of the Canadian province British Columbia: JU-
RIST Canada's browsable dictionary of basic Canadian legal terms;  
http//jurist.law.utoronto.ca/dictionary.htm#sectB (accessed 29 December 2009). 
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ion in its multicultural policy. Therefore, respect for other opinions is an im-
portant virtue and blasphemy a real vice. Canadian law not only prohibits 
harming groups in these respects but also prescribes positive policies to sup-
port groups. The Canadian constitution prescribes ‘the preservation and en-
hancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians.’ All governments in 
Canada are duty-bound to stimulate the various groups in the expression of 
their cultures. Religions, of course, are part of those cultures.17 The constitu-
tion grants people freedom of conscience and freedom of speech. Moreover, 
the Multiculturalism Act states that persons ‘belonging to ethnic, religious or 
linguistic minorities shall not be denied the right to enjoy their own culture, 
to profess and practise their own religion or to use their own language’. This 
looks generous, but in the 21st century the key question is how to deal with 
customs, practices, and opinions of one ‘group’ of people felt to be offensive 
or discriminatory by another.18 
The right to affirmative action of the Canadian governments on na-
tional, provincial, and local levels opens the door for the acknowledgement of 
the importance of religion for some groups – not only for the original inhabi-
tants but also for immigrants – and for affirmative action.19 This multicultur-
                                                 
17 Canadian Constitution Act (1867) 1982. Part I. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Art. 
2. Fundamental Freedoms: (a) freedom of conscience and religion; (b) freedom of thought, belief, opin-
ion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication; (c) freedom of 
peaceful assembly; and (d) freedom of association. Art. 15: Equality Rights: (1) Every individual is equal 
before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without 
discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, col-
our, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability. Affirmative action programs:  
(2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as its object the ame-
lioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups including those that are disadvantaged 
because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability. Art. 
27: Multicultural heritage: This Charter shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preserva-
tion and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians. 
18 In Ontario a request to institute shari’ah courts for the mediation of family disputes was not 
granted straightforwardly because of complaints about the position of women in shari’ah law. In an 
intriguing extension of the law, the Ontario government found a compromise that granted possibilities 
for Muslims to be mediators, while preserving gender equality. Cf. my ‘“Church” and State Relations in 
the Public Square: French Laicism and Canadian Multiculturalism,’ in: Studies in Interreligious Dialogue 
16 (2006): 190-210. 
19 Canadian Multiculturalism Act (1985, Current to 2 December 2009), Art. 3: ‘(1) It is hereby de-
clared to be the policy of the Government of Canada to (a) recognize and promote the understanding 
that multiculturalism reflects the cultural and racial diversity of Canadian society and acknowledges 
the freedom of all members of Canadian society to preserve, enhance and share their cultural heritage; 
… (g) promote the understanding and creativity that arise from the interaction between individuals and 
communities of different origins; (h) foster the recognition and appreciation of the diverse cultures of 
Canadian society and promote the reflection and the evolving expressions of those cultures.’ Cf. also 
Art. 5. 
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alism has to be balanced by strategies to stimulate social cohesion. People are 
not to harm others through the expression of their culture and opinions. In 
that respect another law, Canada’s Criminal Code, states the rules for blas-
phemy and defines ‘defamatory libel’ as follows: Art. 298: 
(1) A defamatory libel is matter published, without lawful justification or ex-
cuse, that is likely to injure the reputation of any person by exposing him to 
hatred, contempt or ridicule, or that is designed to insult the person of or con-
cerning whom it is published. 
It is clear that it is not necessary for the author to have intended to harm 
another but only that what he writes will likely have the effect, directly or 
somewhat indirectly, by word or otherwise.20 All such publications are ‘an 
indictable offence’ regardless of whether they are true or not true, but if the 
author knows that the libel is false, the sentence of imprisonment has a 
maximum of five instead of two years (art. 300-01). However, Canadians live 
in a democracy, and democracy depends on endeavours in the interest of the 
common good – and therefore criticism of positions that hinder valuable de-
velopments. In a democracy the public needs such information as well. 
Therefore criticism is possible, even if someone is thereby exposed. Damag-
ing a person’s reputation through a publication can happen simply as a mat-
ter of course, and therefore the Criminal Code contains many rules for pro-
tecting the media or people who criticise certain circumstances from the 
charge of defamatory libel, as in art. 309: (Public benefit):  
No person shall be deemed to publish a defamatory libel by reason only that he 
publishes defamatory matter that, on reasonable grounds, he believes is true, 
and that is relevant to any subject of public interest, the public discussion of 
which is for the public benefit. 
Since Canadian Law is careful to promote peaceful coexistence among 
its citizens and their right to live in accordance with their traditions, it has to 
preserve reciprocal respect and harmony as well. The Criminal Code declares 
seeding hatred to be a serious offence, i.e. ‘Hate propaganda,’ art. 319:  
(1) Every one who, by communicating statements in any public place, incites 
hatred against any identifiable group where such incitement is likely to lead to 
                                                 
20 Criminal Code, DEFAMATORY LIBEL (art. 297-316). Art. 298 (2) describes the means: ‘A de-
famatory libel may be expressed directly or by insinuation or irony (a) in words legibly marked on any 
substance; or (b) by any object signifying a defamatory libel otherwise than by words.’
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a breach of the peace is guilty of (a) an indictable offence and is liable to im-
prisonment for a term not exceeding two years…21  
This offence carries the same punishment when someone does it wilfully 
(b) but also states that it is not an offence (3b) to communicate truths in 
good faith. So in Canada I can try to convince a Muslim that Mohammed was 
a gifted person but not a prophet, or an atheist that he is blind not to see 
things that are not quantifiable but evident to those who can, or a Buddhist 
that he is attached to emptiness, or a member of the native peoples that the 
powers they believe in do not exist, or a Christian that Jesus’ moral teaching 
is not much help in this world – if and only if I provide reasons. And I would 
probably have to show that I was an agnostic pluralist and was not trying ‘to 
point out, for the purpose of removal, matters producing or tending to pro-
duce feelings of hatred toward … identifiable group[s] in Canada.’ 
Of course, the phrases of the law that refer to the communication of 
‘truths,’ ‘in good faith,’ and ‘in public interest’ are food for philosophers, and 
not least the idea that judges or juries are in a position to ‘judge’ us. Who can 
decide if our arguments are reasonable? Perhaps our arguments are reason-
able in one ethnic and religious group but not in another. Nevertheless, Ca-
nadian policy and law aim at a society in which people respect others and 
grant them the opportunity to live according to their own traditions. The 
boundary is when it becomes a matter of seeding hatred, contempt, and, I 
would say, undermining the dignity of people, damaging their interests, and 
destroying social cohesion – unless, of course, the criticism is well intended 
and can be understood as reasonable and (possibly?) true. 
 
 
6. PHILOSOPHICAL POINTS BEHIND THESE CASES 
On the basis of these two cases I will stress three elements that, on the 
one hand, make or should make the application of the law more complex 
and, on the other, make it more true to life. First, Canadian law does not dis-
tinguish between a religion and individuals who “have” religious beliefs and 
practices. In a recent Dutch court case against the popular politician Geert 
Wilders, the court distinguished between Islam as an entity and Muslims.22 
                                                 
21 The maximum penalty of two years’ imprisonment proves that blasphemy/spreading hatred is 
a very serious crime. The maximum penalty in the shari’ah laws in Northern Nigeria for blasphemy is 
also two years (with the exception of Kano State) – with the possibility of caning. Cf. nt 8. 
22 Trouw, 16 October 2010, 3. The two main grounds for the state attorney not to plead guilty are: 
(1) a sharp distinction between the religion and persons (critique on religion must be possible; feelings 
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One of Wilders’ milder expressions was ‘There is too much Islam in the 
Netherlands.’23 Obviously in his view, he is warning the public that the com-
mon good is at stake because Islam is a political ideology (and not a religion) 
that intends to rule the world. He does not object to Muslims as human be-
ings but hopes that they will be converted to something else. So in the inter-
est of those who presently are Muslims and in the interest of the common 
good, he rejects Islam clearly and distinctly. The question here is not if such 
language qualifies as hate language that is forbidden by law or perhaps as a 
truth to which we rudely have to wake people up eventually. Rather, the 
question is that of the validity of the distinction between the rejection of Is-
lam as 100 % evil and the adherents of this false ideology. Is there a fine line 
between saying ‘There is too much Islam in the Netherlands’ and ‘There are 
too many Muslims in the Netherlands’? We should look at the Canadian 
definition of blasphemous libel as: The publication of material that would 
shock and outrage the feelings of believing Christians, already quoted above. 
The question is if one can respect people while greatly insulting their beliefs 
by suggesting that they either abandon their faith or leave the country. This 
legal distinction rests on a philosophical distinction between persons and 
their worldview. If this distinction is valid, the expression ‘We have to fight 
Muslims’ would be hate language, but to say ‘Islam is a perverted tradition’ 
would not be blasphemy (although it ‘would shock and outrage the feelings 
of believing’ Muslims). However, that such a distinction between a worldview 
tradition and the believers/adherents is possible is not a neutral but a phi-
losophical position that needs to be argued. I think it is impossible to argue 
for such a position without a thorough knowledge of religious studies. 
The second philosophical point in Canadian law is that it does not make 
a sharp distinction between religion and culture. It is obvious that the native 
people of North America would reject any distinction between their religious 
beliefs and practices on the one hand and their culture on the other. Neither 
would orthodox Jews, Muslims, or Christians. If we define a worldview tradi-
tion – secular or religious – as an internalised configuration of insights into 
life, values, and long-lasting moods, and culture as a configuration of ways of 
life, we then have to acknowledge a broad overlap of worldview and culture. 
They cannot be distinguished sharply. Because culture and religion influence 
each other, all religious traditions differ, depending on their cultural con-
                                                                                                                                         
of believers are not relevant); (2) the context of the critique has to be taken into consideration: the 
political and public debate.  
23 NRC Handelsblad, 24 February 2007, cf. 16 October 2010. 
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texts.24 The sharp distinction between culture and religion is difficult to de-
fend. I think that cultural and religious studies show that worldviews and 
cultures are interwoven. Therefore, we cannot say: ‘I respect your culture, but 
I reject your religious values.’ 
The third point follows from the two above. It is the distinction between 
a sharp critique and mockery of religious beliefs and a mockery of the person. 
Because ‘Islam’ stands for the values of Muslims, the expression ‘There is too 
much Islam in the Netherlands’ implies that there are too many Muslims in 
the Netherlands, and this implies that people cannot be accepted with their 
deepest beliefs and values – which is discriminatory. On this point we can 
understand the hesitation by the two archbishops of the Church of England 
concerning ‘the abolishment of the law on blasphemy at a time when reli-
gious identity has become such an important issue and about the inclusion of 
religion among “quite different matters, themselves of important signifi-
cance”’ – as already stated. Worldwide religious identities are becoming 
stronger and in this sense in some parts of the world religious bodies are be-
coming more important as religio-cultural entities. I will discuss this point of 
identity below and try to clarify the difference between racism and discrimi-
nation on the one hand and blasphemy on the other. 
 
 
7. CRITIQUE OF SOCIETAL WRONGS 
We have seen that reasonable and well-intended criticisms are allowed 
(and necessary: we do need gadflies), even if they are felt to be offensive or 
damaging to the interests of the people criticised. An example could be the 
protests against fur coats even if the propaganda has sometimes been offen-
sive to those who wore them – fur coats have virtually disappeared from 
sidewalks. An example of a debatable expression of criticism is to accuse 
medical specialists who perform abortions under certain circumstances of 
being murderers. Even though extremist Christians have murdered some 
medical specialists for that reason, right-wing Christians and even some poli-
ticians in the USA continue to engage in such criticism. This is an example of 
religiously motivated hate language that is considered to be in the interest of 
unborn children and society at large. Some instances of opposition to whal-
                                                 
24 Cf. my ‘Religious Hermeneutics, Culture and Narratives’, in: Studies in Interreligious Dialogue 4 
(1994), 189-213, and A Spectrum of Worldviews. An Introduction to Philosophy of Religion in a Pluralistic 
World (Amsterdam/New York: Rodopi 2006), esp. p. 229-301. 
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ing and the mistreatment of animals in the meat industry are other examples 
of contemporary hate language motivated by a worldview.  
These examples show the ‘mechanics’ of the process. A culture has to be 
stable and flexible; it has to cherish its heritage, adapt to new circumstances, 
and improve its material base and moral standards. In order to exist and act 
effectively, cultures need patterns of acting, repertoires of saying and prac-
tices25 because people cannot be constantly engaged in discussion and not 
doing anything. We need stable and accepted patterns, which implies that we 
become used to shortcomings. People who feel those shortcomings or injus-
tices will have to argue their case and expose society’s wrongs. However, to 
overcome the real wrongs in the fabric of society that are thought to be ‘nor-
mal’, some people have to be sharp, to demonstrate, and to attract attention. 
The history of Western civilisation is full of examples: the lack of freedom of 
religion (opposition against the Inquisition), oligarchy (French and Russian 
Revolutions), slavery (Civil War), inequality (equality of citizens, women’s 
rights, racial equality) – to mention only the examples from the political do-
main. I do not think we deny that crucial steps in the process of further civili-
sation – as seen by those of us who applaud the dignity of all human beings, 
the care for animals and respect for nature as a whole with its vitality and 
mysteries – were attained by those who had to make some noise to wake 
other people up. Did the state help those protestors? When they were tried, 
they were sentenced according to the laws they wanted changed. Judges can 
make decisions regarding factual truths but not concerning the truth of 
worldviews. The interests of one group often endanger the interests of others. 
In the above-mentioned examples, the people who revolted intended the best 
for ‘the fabric of society’, and simply wanted justice to be done. There is not 
only One Theory of the Best Interests of Society. The nature of the Common 
Good is debatable, and each idea of the common good is part of a worldview. 
Laws in turn are guided by worldviews. Basic insights into the common good 
of society belong to the most basic ideas that humans have about life and 
existence. We can express this by saying that people consider them ‘holy’. 
Blasphemy is a rude criticism of what is holy to certain people.  
 
 
 
                                                 
25 Cf. André F. Droogers, ‘Changing Culture and The Missiological Mission’, in: Fullness of Life for 
All: Challenges for Mission in Early 21st Century, Inus Daneel et al. (eds.), (Amsterdam/New York: Ro-
dopi 2003), 64-68 (59-72). 
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8. OFFENDING MY IDENTITY 
However, this rude criticism is not just hate language. For that reason I 
can agree with the reservation of the English archbishops concerning the in-
clusion of offences against religion in a longer list – however serious other 
forms of discrimination may be. Discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, 
gender, or sexual orientation does not ‘accept me and my kind as we are’, 
whether we like it or not. Blasphemy, however does not affect my ‘self’ – it 
affects my ‘I.’26 Here we can see the distinction between ourselves as we are, 
i.e. ‘products’ ‘made by’ a wide spectrum of causes – genetics, climate, up-
bringing, ethnicity, culture, friends, education, work, and so on – and the 
values, norms and ideals with which we identify. Of course, we now have to 
distinguish between different sorts of values because not all ideals and values 
are constitutive for our identity in the same way. If I say about a big car, ‘I 
don’t like it; you’re just showing off’, I am not criticising the owner as a per-
son but ‘only’ his preference for showy objects that are unnecessarily pollut-
ive, conspicuous, and expensive. Discrimination is the rejection of persons as 
they are ‘made.’ To say ‘I do not trust white people’ is offensive, leads to dis-
crimination and disrupts the fabric of society. But it does not reject persons 
with respect to their ideals, with respect to what they want to be within the 
possibilities they have, given their ‘givenness’. Insulting ‘blacks’ is racist hate 
language that damages people’s interests; its sting is not first that it damages 
their interests but that it does not take them seriously as the persons they 
are. ‘They’(!) are rejected with respect to their ‘self.’ Of course, such discrimi-
nation damages their interests as well as it does the fabric of a democratic 
society because of the rejection of the principle of the dignity of all members 
of that society. 
There is a fine line between not accepting what another is – black, 
brown, yellow, or white – and not accepting the values that people respect 
and how they want to become a certain kind of person. Insulting a specific, 
consciously Muslim Arab for being an Arab is not the same as insulting the 
same Arab Muslim for being Muslim. The former is an offence against what 
he and his family are; but the latter is an offence against what he thinks he 
should be personally and hopes to become. The former may damage his given 
identity; the latter attacks the values, norms, and ideals in his identity con-
                                                 
26 Here I use the distinction in anthropology parallel to a distinction made by Paul Ricoeur, One-
self as Another, trans. Kathleen Blamey (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press 1992), 115-25, p. 132, 
and Vincent Brümmer, ‘Gelijken op een beeld’, in: Zoeken naar het mensbeeld, Gerard J.P. Rijntjes (ed.), 
(Utrecht: Het Spectrum 2000), 217-34 (220f.). 
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struction. If I say (a) that Martin Luther King was ‘just another black man,’ 
that is a different kind of offence from that of saying (b) that he died for 
nothing because his ideals were utterly mistaken. We can argue that (a) en-
tails (b) because the acceptance of a racist position entails the rejection of 
racial equality, and therefore the anti-racist movement as well. For that rea-
son, the law on non-discrimination is basic for a society that takes the equal 
worth of all people seriously. However, the question is if the prohibitions of 
discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, and sexual orientation 
cover blasphemy in its modern form – not as an offence against God but as 
one against the high ideals of persons, their ‘holy’.  
If somebody says – more sharply than Karl Marx did27 – ‘Your ideas 
about God and the world are abject; religion is the worst thing history has 
produced,’ the offence strikes not at my views but at basic insights that guide 
my conscious life and sensitivities. It tries to nullify who I am as a person, 
who I want to be and become. The insights that are basic to my conscious 
and responsible life are rejected, and not simply debated and criticised. This 
affects me in my identification with certain values and ideals. I cannot help 
being black or brown, but I am responsible for what I try to make of my life 
(inevitably influencing the lives of others by what I have and have not done). 
It differs from criticising one’s choice of a car, and is more like a rude criti-
cism of my wife or of the goals I want to achieve – it comes closer to the heart 
of who I am, my ‘I.’ My identity is partly fixed, partly forced upon me (I had 
to choose…), partly chosen (… and I choose…), and partly determined by my 
own values and ideals that I hold – let us say – holy. These ideas are essential 
for the integration of experiences that we have and help us to prioritise all 
obligations that we feel, and choose among the possibilities for action. They 
are basic to the repertoires of how we live.28 
Although these elements of our identity are interwoven with one an-
other, we can distinguish between the rejection of the person as a whole on 
grounds for which the person is not responsible and rejection on the basis of 
                                                 
27 Cf. Marx on religion as ‘die imaginären Blumen an der Kette,’ ‘Zur Kritik der Hegelschen 
Rechtsphilosophie. Einleitung,’ in: Karl Marx/ Friedrich Engels, Werke, Band 1, (Berlin (DDR), Karl 
Dietz Verlag 1976), 378-391 (379). 
28 For a broader analysis of the ego/non-ego, see my ‘Über das Verhältnis von Relationalität und 
Subjektivität,’ in: Das Subjekt als Prinzip der Relationalität im Kontext der Religionshermeneutik, ed. 
Gerhard Oberhammer and Marcus Schmücker, [Beiträge zur Kultur- und Geistesgeschichte Asiens] 
(Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften 2010/11), 33-55. 
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insights and ideals that are freely accepted and formative for a person’s iden-
tity.29  
From this follow some comments on the distinctions in the laws that I 
discussed briefly above. Let me repeat the text of the English Law: ‘A person 
who uses threatening words or behaviour, or displays any written material 
which is threatening, is guilty of an offence if he intends thereby to stir up 
religious hatred,’ 30 and the Canadian formulation (298): 
(1) A defamatory libel is matter published, without lawful justification or ex-
cuse, that is likely to injure the reputation of any person by exposing him to 
hatred, contempt or ridicule, or that is designed to insult the person of or con-
cerning whom it is published. 
From the perspective of the theory/philosophy of religion the real point 
of blasphemy is not hatred but humiliation through a crude and total rejec-
tion of what someone holds holy. If hatred is a ‘strong aversion or detestation 
coupled with ill will,’31 blasphemy does not require ill will and may even 
spring from a deep concern about beliefs that somebody thinks are truly mis-
taken and will bode ill for a large group of persons. Somebody wants to shock 
and perhaps expose people for the sake of the higher good. The point of blas-
phemy is not hatred but a rejection of the ideals with which persons identify 
and for which they strive or live completely. Blasphemy implies a total rejec-
tion of the other’s view of what is good and holy, and thus attacks others at 
their heart of who they are. 
 
 
9. THE DANISH CARTOONS 
But let us discuss one of the most typical examples of blasphemy in re-
cent years, the Danish cartoons that depicted the prophet Mohammed – ‘the 
Messenger of God, blessed be His name’ – with a bomb on his head. The sug-
gestion was rather clear: Muslim suicide bombers are followers of Moham-
med; there is something in Islam that stimulates violence. The message thus 
was: be careful in following Mohammed, and it would be better not to follow 
him at all. And do not trust (all) Muslims. Many understood it as a far-
                                                 
29 Of course, I presuppose many nuances in the qualification ‘freely’; see, e.g., my ‘Can We be 
Sure about Contingent Religious Insights?’ in: Religions Challenged to Contingency, Dirk-Martin Grube 
and Peter Jonkers (eds.), (Leiden/Boston: Brill 2008), 205-20. Behind the term ‘accepted’ lie broad dis-
cussions on if and how the will plays a role in the formation of insights. 
30 Racial and Religious Hatred Act, 2006, ch.I, art. 29b (1). 
31 Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary (Springfield, MA.: Merriam 1958), s.v. 
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reaching criticism: Islam is dangerous, and its prophet is deadly. Islamic 
masses in the poorer parts of the world were furious and Muslim leaders in-
dignant. What the cartoonist and the Western press did not realise or even 
know is the extent to which Mohammed is a personal example of piety that 
people try to follow in their lives. God guided his life. God revealed through 
many aspects of Mohammed’s life how He wants people to live. He was not 
sinless, but each time he or his followers and friends acted wrongly, God re-
vealed to him what was wrong and how they should act. Those people were 
rightly guided, directly from above.32 In central respects of their lives Mus-
lims want to be like Mohammed. Therefore, qua identification for Muslims, 
Mohammed is ‘how I want to be’ and not ‘how I am a product of many fac-
tors.’ The cartoons had to do with the ideals of life that Muslims have. With 
respect to politicians suffering from ‘Islamophobia’ we can formulate it more 
strongly: they want to get rid of all Islamic ideals. This does not mean: ‘I am 
wrong in how I have been made’, but: ‘They say that the things that I hold 
holy and live for make me a criminal.’ The latter is not discrimination – as-
cribing a lower status to me – but a rejection of my life project as a whole, 
including my ideas of the common good. Perhaps the UK Racial and Reli-
gious Hatred Act rightly found a common denominator for the rejection of 
selves (whom I am as I have become) and I’s (with which transcendent values 
I identify) in hatred, but there is indeed an important difference between 
both categories. I cannot change my colour, my ethnicity, my sexual orienta-
tion – important as they are, of course, for my ‘self’ – but within the space of 
what I cannot change, I could change or have changed my ideals and all val-
ues for which I have lived. However, I would therefore have to admit that all 
that was holy to me is mistaken and my ‘project’ did not make sense. There-
fore, blasphemy is a serious attack on someone’s integrity. It crosses the bor-
derline between serious and open critical dialogue and simple rejection of 
what some think – whether or not it is based upon hatred or leads to hatred. 
That blasphemy can lead to hatred and discrimination is clear, but that is a 
prudential argument that does not bear on the special point of blasphemy. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
32 Fatih Okumus, ‘The Prophet as Example’, in: Studies in Interreligious Dialogue, 18 (2008): 82-
95. 
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10. CRITIQUE WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES OF COHESION 
Until now we have not answered the question why the state should be 
involved in prohibiting blasphemy. Why should the state worry about our 
integrity, our happiness, and how we deal with our neighbour? Or, con-
versely, why should the state prevent people from being criticised? Why 
should we be limited in how we criticise others? Have the people who op-
posed slavery, apartheid and other ideologies not been silenced – and rightly 
so – because other parties felt themselves attacked in their integrity? 
The task of the state in relation to discrimination is rather clear. Non-
discrimination is a principle of all Western states and human rights codes. 
Hate language is not straightforwardly discrimination but easily leads to it 
and therefore implies a real change or damage. Therefore, it is prohibited – as 
we have seen in the Canadian and UK laws. Other human rights are the free-
doms of religion, conscience, and assembly. Hateful criticisms of the beliefs 
of specific persons or groups of persons could adversely affect their freedoms 
(or other interests) considerably; they could lead to the prohibition of head-
scarves, the building of mosques and minarets, evangelisation and dawa, or 
even care of orphans and poor people in Christian, Muslim or whatever insti-
tutions. Therefore, the state is obligated to protect people as much as it is 
able – given the freedoms of speech, expression and press – and prevent criti-
cism that is offensive, hurts people unnecessarily, and possibly damages their 
material interests as well as their possibilities for living out their religious 
ideals in society. With the Canadian law we could add: unless the criticism is 
not welcome but nevertheless true. Of course, we should also add: as far as 
the court can judge about worldview insights and ideals. 
The question was if blasphemy has a special place. So far I have argued 
that sharp criticisms of our cherished values and aims of life affect us espe-
cially because our lives are or should be guided by those values. Therefore, 
criticism is personal in a way that criticisms of ethnicity, gender and sexual 
orientation are not because I can change – or could have changed – my in-
sights into life. But other characteristics I cannot change. This difference has 
consequences on the societal level as well. In society we have to live and work 
together and trust that our interests are taken seriously, whether we are poor 
or rich, ill or healthy, whether we can help ourselves or not. Therefore, soci-
ety is dependent on the good will of the population or at least of a good per-
centage of it, i.e. for social cohesion. Because we depend on one another and 
have to work together, we have to find sets of common values and shared 
practices, and trust one another enough to feel at least some solidarity. 
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Therefore, the state has an interest in the commonalities that citizens accept. 
Mutual agreements are not natural but arise through societal processes. 
However, because of the freedoms of religion, worldview, and conscience, the 
state cannot interfere in the different worldviews – be they secular or reli-
gious – and therefore the state depends on the values that it cannot itself 
force on its citizens.33 The state can stimulate the transmission of its constitu-
tional values but has to be careful not to choose implicitly between the vari-
ous ideas of the Good Life and the Common Good that are present in society. 
On the other hand, because no socio-economic or political system is perfect, 
and the circumstances change constantly, it is also in everyone’s interest that 
wrong or outdated institutions and worldviews should be cracked open and 
developed further. One could think here of the old stories of Athens and Je-
rusalem, the end of slavery and witch hunts.   
In my view, the state has a responsibility to stimulate a proper exchange 
between people with different opinions. The state does have some responsi-
bilities here: (1) to preserve the freedom of religion/worldview and con-
science, (2) to further social cohesion in the widest sense of the word and 
therefore organise the exchange of ideas about life and the common good, (3) 
not to suppress but stimulate open debate and serious criticism from the dif-
ferent perspectives that people have. 
If we accept the responsibility of the government in relation to world-
view pluralism and the inevitable conflict of opinions, the government has to 
respect serious disagreements but try to make them fruitful. Blasphemy is 
counter-productive. From this follows another reason why people who feel 
the need to criticise the opinions of others will not engage in blasphemy. If 
they want to convince others of the need to rethink their beliefs – secular or 
religious – especially to improve society, their criticisms have to be commu-
nicated successfully. In this respect sharp criticism can fulfil the criterion that 
they are in the interest of society. It sometimes happens that people have to 
try to wake others up in order to move on, break the status quo, and adapt to 
new circumstances and challenges. Some people will feel that they have to 
make a great deal of noise. However, if the lines of communication are 
blocked, the dialogue stops, and those who are offended will strengthen their 
own identity in opposition to the criticism. Therefore I think we have to re-
spect three insights:  
                                                 
33  Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, ‘Die Entstehung des Staates als Vorgang der Säkularisation’,  in: 
Idem, Staat, Gesellschaft, Freiheit (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp 1967), 42-64 (60).  
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 People do have contradictory views of the ‘common good’ and strive 
hard to win debates and change society. In the end the state has to 
make compromises; 
 Social cohesion entails the idea of criticism and the competition of 
ideas; otherwise it ends up as a totalitarian system; 
 ‘Criticism in the interest of the public’ requires that the communica-
tion be successful; otherwise it is not in the interest of society. 
 
Where there is no social cohesion, there is no justice and harmony, and 
after a while no well-being either. Therefore, blasphemy as bitter ridicule or 
denigration of what is holy for others is an offence against somebody’s integ-
rity. When it involves groups of people it can be dangerous for ‘the fabric of 
society’. Criticism should be much more precise and not offend what is really 
ultimate and holy to people. I am afraid that in the old Athens and Jerusalem 
the leaders misunderstood what was really at stake. Therefore, the state 
should prohibit blasphemy but not be quick to punish. Social cohesion is 
helped not by punishment but by a state policy that stimulates the exchange 
of views and proper knowledge about worldview traditions and cultures. 
People who are offended in their innermost identity because their deep be-
liefs are ridiculed or made suspect may be able to hold the other party ac-
countable in court. 
 
 
 
 
